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Confusing Victims and Victimizers:
Nicaragua and the Reinterpretation of
International Law
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER*
"The United Nations is the most concentrated assault on moral real-
ity in the history of free institutions, and it does not do to ignore that
fact or, worse, to get used to it." William Buckley'
"International law is that thing which the evil ignore and the
righteous refuse to endorse." Leon Uris 2
From the time of its earliest beginnings down to the present day,
public international law has been something less than a search for the
Holy Grail. Roman precedent provided the fertile soil for the roots of in-
ternational law, the writings of Augustine and Aquinas aided in its evolu-
tion, the development of sixteenth and seventeenth century classical the-
ory provided a firm foundation, and it was finally implemented by the
political realities surrounding the Peace of Westphalia.3 As it has evolved
over the past four and one-half centuries, the prime purpose of the law of
nations has been to prevent the emergence of a Darwinian global order.
The discredited political credo of the ancient world was that "might
made right." The charge of hostile critics in the present century, who ar-
gue that international law has failed to achieve its grandiose objectives,
has been that international law is merely what the international lawyers
delcare it to be. A jaundiced contemporary observer might add that inter-
national law, when viewed from a U.N. perspective, is what the anti-
Western bloc in the United Nations wants it to be."
International law does not consist of a fixed system of binding rules
imposed upon nation-states by the collective will of a world community.
* Professor of Law (On Leave), Pettit College of Law Ohio Northern University; Assis-
tant Counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate. B.A. 1955, Northwestern University; M.A. 1957, Northwestern University;
Ph.D. 1963, Northwestern University; J.D. 1973, DePaul University College of Law. Mem-
ber, Advisory Board of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
The opinions presented in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect
in any way the views of the Subcommittee on the Constitution or of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
1. Quoted in D. P. MOYNIHAN & S. WEAVER, A DANGEROUS PLACE 29 (1980).
2. L. URIs, ExoDus 498 (1958).
3. Cf P. HAGGENMACHECHER, GROTIUS ET LA DOCTRIN DE LA GUERRE JUSTE (1983); H.
WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST
TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, 1-64 (1845); Gross, The Peace of Westphalia,
1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 25-46 (L. Gross ed. 1969).
4. Cf., e.g., MOYNIHAN & WEAVER, supra note 1, at 39-288.
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There is, for all intents and purposes, no compulsory judicial process.
Professor Beres writes of a law of the U.N. Charter and implies that it
contains a codified expression of international law." Professor Sohn opti-
mistically, and unrealistically, entitled a casebook of a generation ago:
Cases on United Nations Law, and then went on to write, in a second,
revised edition about a "constitutional law of the United Nations."'6 Yet,
despite their admonitions and exhortations, post-Charter international
law is not doing the job for which its advocates maintain it was intended.
Public international law is not a statutory system. It operates upon a
horizontal rather than a vertical plane and lacks a generalized means of
enforcement or coercion. Economic sanctions, as one form of coercion,
have not worked well, even when legitimated at the world community
level under the auspices of either the League of Nations or the United
Nations.7 The international legal process functions now, as in the past, on
the basis of comity, reciprocity, and mutuality. It is aided by treaties and
conventions, which in turn rely upon the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda, the good faith obligation to carry out treaty terms.
Treaties and conventions historically have provided much of the sub-
stantive nature of international law, though custom and tradition (partic-
ularly in the form of general practice) have been held to be of almost
equal significance. Professor D'Amato calls custom "perhaps the most ba-
sic and most important of the secondary rules of international law. . .."
Custom deals with a habitual activity more than a required pattern of
activity. Not by accident is pre-Charter international law often called cus-
tomary international law. Professor van Hoof, in his somewhat controver-
sial study of the sources of international law, claims that "custom is in
decline."9 A modern post-Charter tendency among the non-Western
United Nations majority is to emphasize the third category listed by Arti-
cle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice-"the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." The non-Western ma-
jority in the U.N. takes this view because they are able, by means of Gen-
eral Assembly declarations and resolutions, to refashion or to reinterpret
existing international norms, as well as to invent new ones.
What, then, is left as to the definitional aspect of international law?
Despite the extravagant claims made by its political advocates and aca-
demic acolytes, perhaps the most appropriate description is the famous
statement made by Justice Potter Stewart about a more exotic subject,
but which certainly can be made applicable to international law: I can't
define it, and I can't explain it, but I sure as heck know it when I see it.
5. L. BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER 101-104
(1984) [hereinafter cited as REALPOLITIK].
6. L. SOHN, CASES ON UNrrE NATIONS LAW (2nd. ed. rev. 1967).
7. For a recent dissenting view, see Editorial, When Sanctions Make Sense, The Econ-
omist, Aug. 3, 1985, at 59.
8. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1971).
9. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1983).
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International law is like its municipal counterpart in the sense that its
structure and institutions are merely reflective of the aspirations, ambi-
tions, and conduct of humankind. Not all of these characterizations are
particularly noble. In essence, public interntional law turns out to be a
code of generalized behavior governing the relations of nation-states. It is
not, as Professor Beres implies, a set of absolute principles to be enforced
and obeyed by the world community of nations. Whatever international
law is, it definitely is not a "branch of ethics."'
Public international law deals with such things as recognition of new
governments, creation of new states, the transfer of sovereignty, treaty
interpretation, determination of national and international boundaries,
self-defense, the laws of war-all being of prime importance in the turbu-
lent and chaotic contemporary world. Whether it be Central America, the
Middle East, or Southeast Asia, the fundamental challenge for the inter-
national legal system remains the same: How can stability and order be
introduced into regions where radical change is the desired end, and vio-
lence accompanied by disorder is the accepted and even the legitimated
means?
The twentieth century is unique in the history of international law in
that twice, following two prolonged global conflicts, an international se-
curity organization was created representing the world community of na-
tions. Each time the organization in question was given the express func-
tion of preserving a minimum standard of world order. Both the League
of Nations and the United Nations were, in origin and by design, collec-
tive security mechanisms which were specifically intended to maintain
and keep the peace. The League made a weak attempt and inevitably
failed. The United Nations in this respect seems to be following the same
path.1 '
Before the Second World War, in fact dating back to its very origins,
international law dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with nation-states.
Individuals, at best, were merely the objects of international law and not
the subjects. Since the end of the Second World War, largely as a result
of the Nuremberg trials, the U.N. Charter, and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights have brought individuals within the protection of the
international legal system. But so-called human rights "law" remains a
questionable body of principles, confusing and confounding the more set-
10. Beres, Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in
Central America, 14 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 77, 85 (1985) [hereinafter cited as International
Law].
11. The conservative columnist, James Kilpatrick, refers to U.N. debates as "the vapor-
ings of an impotent body,"and goes on to add "[i]ts purpose as a forum has been reduced to
a nullity." Kilpatrick, U.N. Assembly Again Shows Its Hypocrisy, The Blade (Toledo),
Sept. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 6. See also, Yesselson, Remarks, The United Nations: Reorganiz-
ing for World Order, 1976 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 144-148. Professor Yesselson's
phrase,"House of Blood," was expunged by the editors from the printed version.
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tied norms (themselves still debated) of public international law. 2 Pro-
fessor Beres has added to the confusion, and to the scholarly cacophony,
by melding together human rights, humanitarian intervention, and inter-
national law.
The claim that "contemporary international law concerning human
rights is necessarily founded upon a broad doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention,"113 is plainly in error. Humanitarian intervention, in the post-
Charter decades, is a highly controversial concept which has occasioned a
deep split among legal publicists. Humanitarian intervention can be a le-
gitimate and necessary remedy in certain well-defined instances (i.e.-ter-
rorists hostage seizure incidents),1 4 but non-Western support for this ap-
proach barely exists. The problem with Beres' analyses, and those by a
number of other critics of the Reagan Administration, 5 is that they com-
ingle and coalesce principles, norms, and rights, using these terms inter-
changeably, without careful distinction and delimitation. Their theoreti-
cal view of the law as it ought to be, rather than of the legal order as it
actually functions, implies-erroneously-that public international law is
a vertical system of law enforcement instead of a horizontal network of
mutuality and reciprocity.
From the time of the promulgation of the United Nations Charter, in
the last week of June, 1945, until the present day, the U.S. Department of
State has viewed the Charter of the United Nations as a multilateral
treaty, and a number of prestigous commentators share this view.' 6 This
means, first, that the U.N. Charter is not the fundamental law of the
world community of nations, although it can be considered as the consti-
tution of an international organization of sovereign entities. This signifies,
in turn, that the Charter is binding upon a particular member, or group
of members, in the same sense as the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (or
good faith obligation) operates with respect to the implementation of
treaty provisions between signatory parties.
12. Cf. the provacative analyses offered by M. MoscowiTz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1968); M. MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
(1974); M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); Watson, The Limited Utility of
International Law in the Protection of Human Rights, 1980 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1-6;
Watson, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in Interna-
tional Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609. For an opposing view, see the sweeping and all-embracing
claims put forward by L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
13. International Law, supra note 10, at 82; REALPOLITIK, supra note 5, at 107-8.
14. Friedlander, The Mayaguez in Retrospect: Humanitarian Intervention or Showing
the Flag?, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601 (1978). For the authoritative pre-Charter view, see E.
STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921).
15. Among the most rabidly hostile are Sultan, Ronald Reagan on Human Rights: The
Gulag vs. the Death Squads, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 339 (1985); Boyle, International Law-
lessness in the Caribean Basin, 21-22 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 37 (1984); and REALPOLITIK, supra
note 5.
16. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (3rd. ed.
1979); G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122,125 (6th
ed. 1976); J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 95 (1968).
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Second, violation of those treaty obligations, or the refusal to abide
by a specific obligation, raises the issue of how the failure to perform by
one party to a multilateral treaty affects the other signatories, or the ad-
versary signatory, in a confrontational situation. A fundamental question
for the international legal order, still unresolved, continues to be: what
role does the Charter play in the contemporary international legal sys-
tem? Professor Beres, in a rare moment of candor, reluctantly admits
that "[t]he state of nations is still the state of nature.'
7
President Reagan's foreign policy assumptions, even those that have
gone awry, have been favorably perceived by the majority of the Ameri-
can electorate, as contrasted with their decisive rejection of the ineffec-
tual Carter record, which current liberal analysts prefer not to remember.
A large portion of the general public believed that Carter had guessed
wrong on Iran and had guessed wrong on Nicaragua, when he literally
pulled the props out from under a weakening Samoza regime. The suc-
ceeding Reagan Administration, therefore, resolved to avoid any further
misjudgments occasioned by compromise and vacillation, which also
marked the generally unimposing Carter human rights record. Notwith-
standing the fact that the Carter White House claimed the highest prior-
ity for a human rights agenda, the realities of the Carter program were
confusion, disappointment, and frequent self-defeat.
For one thing, neither President Carter nor his State Department
subordinates ever defined human rights clearly, either for its friends or its
foes.18 For another, U.S. human rights implementation was properly
viewed by other governments as being arbitrary, capricious, vague, and
overbroad. In a final appearance before the Organization of American
States General Assembly in late November, 1980, the recently defeated
President assertively pointed with pride to what he claimed to be a new
governmental conscience created in the Western Hemisphere. Due in
good part to his efforts, Carter boasted, the cause of human rights had
now become an "historic movement."
The succeeding Reagan Administration quickly proclaimed a willing-
ness to aid the fight against radical terrorist insurrection or guerrilla in-
surgency in the Western Hemisphere. During the presidential campaign
of 1980, candidate Reagan warned, with respect to the threat of growing
Marxist subversion in Central America, that "[w]e are the last domino.""
Given the current security problems with Nicaragua and El Salvador, this
statement was hardly far-fetched. Thus, the Reagan Administration cor-
rectly maintained that a hands-off posture in Central America would in-
evitably result in an adverse domino effect.
17. REALPOLITIK, supra note 5, at 5.
18. See Friedlander, Human Rights Theory and NGO Practice: Where Do We Go
From Here? in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO
STRATEGIES 219-222 (V. Nanda, J. Scarett, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
19. Quoted in Grande, A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador, 6
INT'L SECURITY 27, 45 (Summer 1981).
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Most critics of U.S. policy toward Central America, such as Professor
Beres, have yet to free themselves from the murky grip of the Vietnam
quagmire. All three presidential administrations during the last decade
found themselves immobilized by prior history and confrontational polit-
ics. It is undeniable that the Vietnam war dramatically exposed the limits
of American power in a dangerously chaotic world. It is also self-evident
that present U.S. policy in Central America represents, in part, a return
to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This came about because Rea-
ganism in international affairs, as in domestic philosophy, sought to re-
vert to traditional values and to stress historic ideals.
Central America was chosen as the Administration's first ideological
battleground in the world arena. There is no doubt that the Reagan strat-
egy in Central America represents, basically, a return to the "Monroeism"
of the past. However, foreign intervention should be no more permissible
today than it was at the time of John Quincy Adams and James Monroe.
Based on the premise that freedom is not divisible, the national interest
is best served by opposing foreign governments propogating alien ideolo-
gies which initiate, sponsor, and sustain extremist insurgencies through-
out the Western Hemisphere.
There also appears to be emerging, though rather tentatively, a "Rea-
gan Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. So far, it has emphasized rhetoric
(a Reagan trademark) over specific implementation. But its meaning is
clear and gradually has been gathering congressional support. The pre-
mise under the Monroe Doctrine is simple and straightforward-that no
foreign government or expansionist ideology should be able to impose its
alien system by means of armed force from outside the Western Hemi-
sphere. The "Corollary," as it applies to Latin American and Carribean
regimes, is that military aid and assistance will be given to any beseiged
non-Marxist Latin American state whose political independence and ter-
ritorial integrity is violated by a hostile aggressor, espousing an expan-
sionists ideology.
That premise explains the U.S. security guarantee to Honduras. and
also explains the difference between the dangerous Soviet support of the
Sandinistas and the current Reagan Administration policy. The latter is
designed to protect not only the United States security interests, but also
hemispheric freedom. Russian and Cuban involvement in Nicaragua has
meant Marxist subversion in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and a growing mili-
tary threat to the borders of neighboring Honduras. These pressures re-
quire a policy similar to those of the Reagan Administration in order to
promote hemispheric peace.
The Monroe Doctrine has been, and remains, a generally recognized
legal norm.2 0 During the past generation, particularly under Presidents
Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, the United States interpreted Monroe's
20. Thomas & Thomas, The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doc-
trine-Legal Implications, 30 La. L. Rev. 541 (1970). For a critical approach, see Taylor,
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proclamation to be founded upon a previously asserted right to self-pres-
ervation, both for the United States and for the American continents. A
"Johnson Corollary" was created in connection with the 1965 U.S. inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic, wherein President Johnson justified
that actign as preventing a communist seizure of power in the Western
Hemisphere.2 The Dominican intervention was subsequently endorsed
by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.
TRB, The New Republic's lead columnist, wrote that "the Reagan
doctrine is the Brezhnev doctrine",2 2 and that the former implies that the
United States will uninhibitedly "molest" any nation in its national
desires.2 This argument ignores the factual reality. If there were any re-
maining doubts as to what the Sandinistas were up to in Central America,
they should by now be dispelled from the continuing indications of Nica-
raguan aid and assistance to the Marxist rebels in El Salvador. " Nicara-
gua has provided a haven for Red Brigade and PLO terrorists, and there
is more than mere suspicion that they have provided safe-refuge for other
perpetrators of international terror-violence.2  Those advocates of
Sandinista nobility and integrity seem to be rerunning the Vietnam story
all over again. "[T]here is already a richly elaborated romanticization of
the Sandinistas, much like the romanticization of the Vietnamese and
Cambodian Communists.
'26
Why the United States is held to an untenable standard by angry
critics of American foreign policy (wherever that policy may be applied),
while America's adversaries clearly are not, is one of the most perplexing
questions of U.S. academic and intellectual life. Despite the propagators
of political gloom and doom, American policy has worked in El Salvador
and democracy continues to improve, if it has not yet prevailed.2 ' No
journalist, to this writer's knowledge, has pointed to the fact that there
Jr., A Revival in Washington for the Monroe Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at 8, col.
1.
21. Rabe, The Johnson (Eisenhower?) Doctrine for Latin America, 9 DIPL. HIST. 95
(1985).
22. The Brezhnev Doctirne dates from 1968, when the First Secretary of the Soviet
Union Communist Party declared that once a state had become part of the Communist
system, it would not be allowed to revert back to its pre-Communist condition. Originally
applied to Eastern Eurpoe, it was later extended by implication to Central America, two
years after the invasion of Afghanistan. See Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and
Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.
621, 678-9 (1985).
23. TRB, The Reagahnev Doctrine, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 4 and 41.
24. See, e.g., Omang, Nicaraguan Aid to Guerrillas Cited, The Washington Post, Aug. 9,
1984, at A31, col. 1.
25. Meese Assails Nicaragua, The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at A10, col.1. Pre-
mier Craxi of Italy denounced the Sandanistas for harboring some of the assassins of Aldo
Moro, when he visited the U.S. in March 1985.
26. Editorial, The Myths of Revolution, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 10.
27. For two examples of a worst case scenario by liberal critics of the Administration,
see Watson, A Test For Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26,1984, at 42-45; Preston, What Du-
arte Won, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Aug. 15, 1985, at 30-35.
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are tens of thousands of Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, Honduras,
Mexico, and the United States, who by the summer of 1985, numbered
more than 50,000.28
The Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogates do not play by the rules,
nor do they care how the game is constituted, as long as they can destab-
lize or dominate the other players. This has forced the U.S. to make some
hard choices. Among the hardest was the decision of the Reagan Adminis-
tration to refuse to litigate the merits of the Nicaraguan charges against
the United States in the International Court of Justice (and to abstain
from litigating Nicaragua's violations of international law). Much heat
and considerable emotion have been generated by the U.S. withdrawal
from the Nicaraguan case. Probably the most restrained criticism, as
compared with that of Professor Beres, was the observation of two politi-
cal scientists that "[in challenging the Court's jurisdiction and subse-
quently abandoning its proceedings, the United States has called into
question the sincerity of its commitment to a public international order
under the rule of law."
2 9
The former Legal Adviser to the Department of State explained to
the author of this essay that "[c]onfidentially, we knew before we went to
the Hague that we were going to lose the case." 30 In fact, any impartial
observer could have warned the American delegation about making a spe-
cial appearance to contest jurisdiction as unsound legal strategy. Of
course, the World Court was going to take the case-if it did not, all that
would be left to the Court in the future would be the power to decide the
ultimate fate of contractual parties, territorial boundaries, and offshore
fishing rights.
One can argue that the political makeup of the Court is inherently at
odds with its juridical function. The dominance of nation-states would
tend to show that Justices of the World Court are inherently biased in
favor of their own national views (and more than susceptable to their own
government's political agenda), 1 but that also depends upon whose ox is
gored. The United States, an unwilling participant in the Nicaragua
case, 32 readily agreed to World Court jurisdiction in the recent U.S.-Cana-
dian fishing rights dispute, with a rather satisfactory outcome for the
American position. The same was true of the Tehran hostages case, 4
where the Soviet judge and the existing Islamic judge voted the way one
28. Senator David Durenberger (R., Minn.) has called it "a conspiracy of silence ......
131 CONG. REC. S1030 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1985).
29. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 22, at 687.
30. Conversation with Davis Robison, Esq., U.S. Department of State, Washington,
D.C., Feb.28, 1985.
31. See Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 379, 380-1 (1985).
32. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 215.
33. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Feb. 24, 1985).
34. United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 4.
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would expect. Given existing political considerations, many other govern-
ments were too vulnerable to future injury to have the decision turn out
adversely from the U. S. perspective. On the other hand, the decision
meant nothing as far as subsequent world events were concerned.
There has been much hand-wringing over the American decision to
refrain from participating in the adjudication of the merits of the Nicara-
gua case," largely centering on the need for an international rule of law.
The real issue remains, however, whose rules and what law? The very fact
that the Court virtually ignored its own prohibition against involving it-
self in an ongoing armed conflict, despite the nature of the Nicaraguan
charges, and of the U.S. counter-charges, demonstrates that the World
Court was primarily interested in extending its own competence and only
secondarily interested in refining and defining the substantive issues.
Last, but certainly not least, is the question of the significance of
World Court decisions in international law. Here, the answer is less than
clear, since in World Court practice, stare decisis, is not recognized as an
official technique of decision-making. Moreover, as Professor van Hoff has
pointed out, the major effect of World Court jurisprudence is confined to
the parties before the Court in a particular dispute."6 A number of au-
thorities have despaired in recent years about the dwindling of the
Court's prestige and about the noticeable diminution of its influence.3"
Consequently, the Court has utilized the Nicaraguan complaint to revive
its flagging fortunes and to restore its fading image. The problem is that
this re-energizing has occurred at U.S. expense.
Critics of the Reagan Administration have for the most part gener-
ated more heat than light (exacerbated by the Administration's over-
blown rhetoric). On the other hand, as the Anglo-American journalist,
Henry Fairlie, has cogently observed, "America is not an empire, and
lives in a world in which it cannot claim to be an empire, but it has not
yet defined its role." 8 As in the past, the argument between Administra-
tion supporters and Administration opponents, between liberal critics and
conservative defenders, between polemicists and legalists, continues to be
over the nature of that role. Nowhere has this been more dramatically
focused than on Nicaragua.
The distinguished scholar, George Lichtheim, no unabashed admirer
of U.S. foreign policy, has wisely written that "casting the United States
in the role of the global aggressor results in nothing but further obfusca-
tion."' 9 The hard fact and cold reality is that the Soviet Union and its
Cuban surrogate have created a Marxist-oriented fortress in Central
35. Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the United States' Attempted Withdrawal from the
Jurisdiction of the World Court in the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON
L.J. 295 (1985).
36. VAN Hoop, supra note 9, at 170-176, 267.
37. See id., at 173-175.
38. Fairlie, The Empire's New Clothes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 17-19.
39. G. LICHTHEIM, IMPERIALISM 147 (1972).
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America in the guise of the Sandinista regime. One might well ask, if the
Sandinistas were not fighting the rebel Contras, then what would they do
with their oversized army and extensive military hardware? The Contras
are in fact performing an important Central American security function,
which is the prevention of Nicaraguan expansionism (in contrast to the
Vietnam example, wherein Vietnam's neighbors have been unable, or un-
willing, to prevent Vietnamese aggression).
Secretary of State, George Schultz, in a speech delivered on February
22, 1985, to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, put the essence of
the Administration's concern clearly, cogently, and effectively;
There is a self-evident difference between those fighting to impose
tyranny and these fighting to resist it .... In each situation it must
always be clear whose side we are on-the side of those who want to
see a world based on respect for national independence, for human
rights, for freedom and the rule of law... but where dictatorships use
brute power to oppress their own people and threaten their neighbors,
the forces of freedom cannot place their trust in declarations alone.40
Name-calling and pious platitudes do not clarify issues and rarely
sharpen intellectual debate. International law must be understood before
it can be applied. To confuse victims with victimizers is a dangerous way
of formulating national policies.
40. Schultz, We Must Not Fail the Freedom Fighters, Reader's Digest, June 1985, at
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